Shape the future of Lazy Summer DAO. Cast your vote on active protocol upgrades and treasury allocations.
**1. Overview:** Following on from [SIP1.7](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip1-7-july-6th-exploit-followup-usdc-lower-risk-ethereum-vault-cleanup-and-market-withdrawals/859) and [SIP1.8](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip1-8-july-6th-exploit-followup-usdc-higher-risk-ethereum-vault-cleanup-and-market-withdrawals/860) this SIP sweeps the USDC from the two buffer arks and transfers the USDC to a MERKL Campaign to allow users to claim the outstanding USDC from the two exploited Vaults, as per the snapshot agreed to in [the RFC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-next-steps-for-exploited-usdc-vaults-on-ethereum/855) --- ### **2. Motivation:** After the exploited, there remains over $4.1M deposited in the Lower and Higher Risk USDC Vaults on Ethereum. These assets should be distributed to the users who had assets in the vault at the time of the Exploit. Because the attacker still had shares in the Vault, it was decided by the DAO to use MERKL.xyz to distribute the assets so the attackers shares could be removed, and affected users get back as much as possible. It should be noted that merkl.xyz have very kindly waived their fees from this distribution, so every last unit of USDC is going to affected users. --- ### **3. Specification:** Created on the base hub and relayed via LayerZero to the mainnet timelock 0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796 for execution. Sweeps the buffer arks of 2 fleet(s) into the timelock: - LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC buffer 0xEB60A8e747d73c58cCc320bcdAbB166F8A0C0D9D: 83751.283461 USDC - LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC buffer 0x106CBB1F445F0bFFa7894F4199EE940BF7f6dD2B: 4048374.307577 USDC and creates ONE Merkl campaign (type 4) distributing 4132125.591039 USDC to users per the off-chain allocation JSON (per-fleet entitlements are encoded in the airdrop reasons). The fleets remain paused throughout. ## Actions 1. PAM.grantCuratorRole(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC, timelock) — temporary, for setSweepableToken 2. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, true) 3. Raft.socializeLosses(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, [USDC], timelock) — sweeps 83751.283461 USDC 4. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, false) — restore whitelist 5. PAM.revokeCuratorRole(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC, timelock) — cleanup 6. PAM.grantCuratorRole(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC, timelock) — temporary, for setSweepableToken 7. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, true) 8. Raft.socializeLosses(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, [USDC], timelock) — sweeps 4048374.307577 USDC 9. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, false) — restore whitelist 10. PAM.revokeCuratorRole(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC, timelock) — cleanup 11. USDC.approve(DistributionCreator, 4132125.591039 USDC) 12. DistributionCreator.acceptConditions() — Merkl T&C (idempotent) 13. DistributionCreator.createCampaign(type 4, 4132125.591039 USDC, start 2026-07-27T11:00:00.000Z, duration 3600s) — pulls the amount via transferFrom --- ### **4. Risk Assessment:** This is deemed a slightly higher risk governance proposal than most because it is using governance to 'sweep' USDC from the buffer ark, which is an action not commonly used, and then transferring a large amount of USDC to an external, third party contract. In mitigation of this risk, the Summer DAO has regularly used Merkl for incentive and reward distributions, and the labs company requested Merkl team to review the Merkl calldata used in this proposal, which they happily did and had no issues. It is still requested though that delegates give a thorough review of this proposal before voting on it, and raise any questions or concerns they may have. --- ### **5. Voting:** Voting **YES** will execute the proposal will sweep all the USDC (approx 4.13M) from the two buffer arks on the Lower Risk and Higher Risk USDC Vaults which were exploited on July 6th, and transfer them to a Merkl Campaign where users who had a balance at the time of the exploit will be able to claim their proportional share. Voting **NO** will not execute any code, the Vault will remain paused and no funds will swept or transferred to Merkl campaign.
**1. Overview:** Following on from [SIP1.7](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip1-7-july-6th-exploit-followup-usdc-lower-risk-ethereum-vault-cleanup-and-market-withdrawals/859) and [SIP1.8](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip1-8-july-6th-exploit-followup-usdc-higher-risk-ethereum-vault-cleanup-and-market-withdrawals/860) this SIP sweeps the USDC from the two buffer arks and transfers the USDC to a MERKL Campaign to allow users to claim the outstanding USDC from the two exploited Vaults, as per the snapshot agreed to in [the RFC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-next-steps-for-exploited-usdc-vaults-on-ethereum/855) --- ### **2. Motivation:** After the exploited, there remains over $4.1M deposited in the Lower and Higher Risk USDC Vaults on Ethereum. These assets should be distributed to the users who had assets in the vault at the time of the Exploit. Because the attacker still had shares in the Vault, it was decided by the DAO to use MERKL.xyz to distribute the assets so the attackers shares could be removed, and affected users get back as much as possible. It should be noted that merkl.xyz have very kindly waived their fees from this distribution, so every last unit of USDC is going to affected users. --- ### **3. Specification:** Created on the base hub and relayed via LayerZero to the mainnet timelock 0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796 for execution. Sweeps the buffer arks of 2 fleet(s) into the timelock: - LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC buffer 0xEB60A8e747d73c58cCc320bcdAbB166F8A0C0D9D: 83751.283461 USDC - LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC buffer 0x106CBB1F445F0bFFa7894F4199EE940BF7f6dD2B: 4048374.307577 USDC and creates ONE Merkl campaign (type 4) distributing 4132125.591039 USDC to users per the off-chain allocation JSON (per-fleet entitlements are encoded in the airdrop reasons). The fleets remain paused throughout. ## Actions 1. PAM.grantCuratorRole(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC, timelock) — temporary, for setSweepableToken 2. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, true) 3. Raft.socializeLosses(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, [USDC], timelock) — sweeps 83751.283461 USDC 4. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, false) — restore whitelist 5. PAM.revokeCuratorRole(LazyVault_HigherRisk_USDC, timelock) — cleanup 6. PAM.grantCuratorRole(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC, timelock) — temporary, for setSweepableToken 7. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, true) 8. Raft.socializeLosses(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, [USDC], timelock) — sweeps 4048374.307577 USDC 9. Raft.setSweepableToken(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC bufferArk, USDC, false) — restore whitelist 10. PAM.revokeCuratorRole(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC, timelock) — cleanup 11. USDC.approve(DistributionCreator, 4132125.591039 USDC) 12. DistributionCreator.acceptConditions() — Merkl T&C (idempotent) 13. DistributionCreator.createCampaign(type 4, 4132125.591039 USDC, start 2026-07-27T11:00:00.000Z, duration 3600s) — pulls the amount via transferFrom --- ### **4. Risk Assessment:** This is deemed a slightly higher risk governance proposal than most because it is using governance to 'sweep' USDC from the buffer ark, which is an action not commonly used, and then transferring a large amount of USDC to an external, third party contract. In mitigation of this risk, the Summer DAO has regularly used Merkl for incentive and reward distributions, and the labs company requested Merkl team to review the Merkl calldata used in this proposal, which they happily did and had no issues. It is still requested though that delegates give a thorough review of this proposal before voting on it, and raise any questions or concerns they may have. --- ### **5. Voting:** Voting **YES** will execute the proposal will sweep all the USDC (approx 4.13M) from the two buffer arks on the Lower Risk and Higher Risk USDC Vaults which were exploited on July 6th, and transfer them to a Merkl Campaign where users who had a balance at the time of the exploit will be able to claim their proportional share. Voting **NO** will not execute any code, the Vault will remain paused and no funds will swept or transferred to Merkl campaign.
1. Overview: This SIP renews the **Guardian Module** established under https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip0-2-establish-guardian-module-emergency-risk-controls/675, whose 180-day mandate **expires on or around 9 August 2026**. It extends the guardian expiration across all four supported chains via `setGuardianExpiration`, and re-confirms the guardian set agreed in principle during SIP0.2. > ***RFC:** https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875 Part B (poll B1/B1a). Polling is still open; this SIP is brought forward ahead of poll close because the mandate expires inside the standard governance cycle.* > ***Conflict of interest:** I am one of the eight guardians and a signer on the Guardian Safe. This proposal preserves a role I hold. Delegates should weigh it accordingly.* --- ### 2. Motivation: #### 2.1 The mandate expires in \~18 days SIP0.2 granted guardian powers with a **180-day expiration**, executed on Base on \~10 February 2026. `ProtocolAccessManager` enforces `MAX_GUARDIAN_EXPIRY = 180 days`, so this was never open-ended by design; therefore it requires affirmative renewal by the DAO. **On expiry, `isActiveGuardian()` returns false and the module goes dark.** Most consequentially, the DAO loses the ability to cancel in-flight malicious proposals: only "with expiry date" guardians hold that power, and only while unexpired. #### 2.2 The module is not theoretical, as it has already saved the protocol In April 2026 a proposal titled *"Revoke Old V1 Roles and Cleanup for V1->V2 Finalization"* was submitted to Governance V1. Per [blockful's analysis](https://forum.summer.fi/t/analysis-of-the-governance-attack-attempt-on-lazy-summer/817), it carried **12 onchain calls against 3 contracts**, of which **10 were legitimate and 2 were malicious**: call #8 granted `GOVERNOR_ROLE` on the `ProtocolAccessManager` to an undocumented EOA, while calls #1 and #4 eliminated every `CANCELLER_ROLE` holder in the Timelock with no replacement, disarming the 48-hour delay itself. Calls #11 and #12 replicated this to Ethereum and Arbitrum via LayerZero. The proposer held **10.001 SUMR against a 10.000 threshold**, an economic barrier of roughly $20 to attempt seizing control of a protocol then managing **\~$40M** across three chains. > **The guardian cancellation path was the only defence that worked**, because the attack was specifically designed to neutralize the Timelock. The report's conclusion is the argument for this SIP in one line: that defence existed only because of a prior governance decision, made before it was needed. #### 2.3 Measured performance to date From the https://forum.summer.fi/t/guardian-multisig-transparency-reporting-thread/787, time from transaction creation to execution: | Date | Action | Response time | |----|----|----| | 23 Mar 2026 | Post-Resolv precaution 6 markets capped to `0` (DAO-Risk-Managed USDC) | **54 min** | | 08 Apr 2026 | **Cancellation of the malicious Governance V1 proposal** | **96 min** | | 20 Apr 2026 | Post-Kelp caps to `0` on 4 ETH + 4 USDC ARKs | **41 min** | | 20 Apr 2026 | Pause deposits, ETH DAO Managed Vault (withdrawals left active) | **42 min** | | 19 May 2026 | Fluid Lite ETH Ark cap to `0` (explicitly non-critical) | **237 min** | Four incidents, four responses inside `100` minutes at a 6/8 threshold, one non-urgent action at `237` minutes. The record shows a functioning module, and it is the principal evidence bearing on the threshold question. #### 2.4 Why renewal is correct under either strategic direction The DAO is deciding its future in https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-determining-the-future-direction-of-lazy-summer-dao/868. Renewal is the right action under both branches: * **Option A (Continue Building):** a protocol rebuilding after an exploit needs its emergency brake more than a stable one does. * **Option B (Orderly Wind-Down):** The RFC explicitly lists *maintaining governance security while treasury decisions are finalized*. A DAO consolidating a treasury is a **more** attractive governance-attack target, not less; and the April attempt shows the cost of attempting one is trivial. Letting the brake lapse precisely while assets are being moved would be the single worst-sequenced decision available. --- ### 3. Specification: #### 3.1 Summary of actions | \# | Action | Executed by | Onchain? | |----|----|----|----| | 1 | Extend guardian expiration on 4 chains | DAO governance (Base + LayerZero) | **Yes** | | 2 | Re-confirm / rotate guardian signer set | Guardian Safe owners | Safe-level | | 3 | Confirm signing threshold | Guardian Safe owners | Safe-level | | 4 | Formalize periodic liveness check | Guardians | Offchain | | 5 | Acknowledge dormant compensation clause | DAO | None | #### 3.2 Onchain execution to extend guardian expiration **Function** (`ProtocolAccessManager`, per SIP0.2): ``` function setGuardianExpiration(address account, uint256 expiration) ``` **Target contracts:** ``` { "base": "0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694", "mainnet": "0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694", "arbitrum": "0xf389BCEa078acD9516414F5dabE3dDd5f7e39694", "sonic": "0xAFb8a8beA8F7CdB4b65437b0c5963dc7Cd270bC6", } ``` **`account` parameter is the Guardian Safe:** ``` 0x91E4482CF58aC14d8DC25290d828b2A4D9492BA4 ``` **`expiration` parameter proposed value:** ``` 1800000000 ``` **Cross-chain routing.** Governance executes on Base and propagates via LayerZero. The April attack analysis confirms live LayerZero routes to **Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Sonic**, if the governor cannot reach those `ProtocolAccessManager` instances via the standard dispatch, this SIP must specify an alternative path (e.g. Foundation execution instruction, as used in SIP5.17) rather than silently leaving chain unguarded. #### 3.3 Proposed transaction set Assuming role-on-Safe and LayerZero reachability, the Base proposal contains: | Call | Chain | Target | Function | Arguments | |----|----|----|----|----| | 1 | Base | `0xf389BC…9694` | `setGuardianExpiration` | `(0x91E4…2BA4, 1800000000)` | | 2 | Ethereum *(via LZ)* | `0xf389BC…9694` | `setGuardianExpiration` | `(0x91E4…2BA4, 1800000000)` | | 3 | Arbitrum *(via LZ)* | `0xf389BC…9694` | `setGuardianExpiration` | `(0x91E4…2BA4, 1800000000)` | | 4 | Sonic *(route TBC)* | `0xAFb8a8…0bC6` | `setGuardianExpiration` | `(0x91E4…2BA4, 1800000000)` | #### 3.4 Guardian set and threshold **Powers are unchanged.** This SIP renews the SIP0.2 mandate verbatim: vault pause, deposit-cap override to `0`, and proposal cancellation; no fund movement, no parameter tuning, no strategy onboarding; reactive use only, under the SIP0.2 trigger thresholds (≥4% realized or projected loss at fleet/ark level, active or credible exploit, severe oracle failure, or external protocol failure materially impacting vault safety). **No expansion of authority is proposed or implied.** **Signer re-confirmation.** All eight guardians are asked to **re-confirm in-thread before the vote opens**, explicitly acknowledging continued availability: | Guardian | Address | |----|----| | [@blockful](https://forum.summer.fi/u/blockful) | `0x1F3D3A7A9c548bE39539b39D7400302753E20591` | | [@Raphael_Anode](https://forum.summer.fi/u/Raphael_Anode) | `0x6ad64B3B5300821b651aF5415c2119a6ED4e2007` | | [@halaprix](https://forum.summer.fi/u/halaprix) | `0x718b75a546a1b7edf107199aaa62dc257cb7ee80` | | [@MasterMojo](https://forum.summer.fi/u/mastermojo) | `0xF68D2BfCecd7895BBa05a7451Dd09A1749026454` | | [@jensei](https://forum.summer.fi/u/jensei) | `0x746bb7beFD31D9052BB8EbA7D5dD74C9aCf54C6d` | | [@JavierD](https://forum.summer.fi/u/javierd) | `0xcA4Bc5E1564EBdC2b7e2C9e498735860668A807f` | | [@chrisb](https://forum.summer.fi/u/chrisb) | `0xe9c245293dac615c11a5bf26fcec91c3617645e4` | | [@Sixty](https://forum.summer.fi/u/sixty) | `0x84bC99d6067f30E01e32D7E7E193d68E24546EcC` | **Rotation.** Three guardians ([@chrisb](https://forum.summer.fi/u/chrisb), [@halaprix](https://forum.summer.fi/u/halaprix), [@jensei](https://forum.summer.fi/u/jensei)) are associated with the winding-down Labs Co. Continued participation is a personal commitment, not an institutional one, and each should state plainly whether they can sustain it. Standing backups already identified: [@Thomas](https://forum.summer.fi/u/thomas) (`0xF523EEc9E35a697E5bc3e3534167BE9bAdB68e2D`), [@TokenBrice](https://forum.summer.fi/u/tokenbrice), and [@Meta](https://forum.summer.fi/u/meta), who [expressed continued interest](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip0-2-establish-guardian-module-emergency-risk-controls/675) in February. Signer changes are executed at the Safe level and do not alter the calldata above, provided the Safe address is unchanged. #### 3.5 Compensation is dormant, and stated plainly SIP0.2 allocated **15% of DAO-managed vault income** to a guardian compensation pool, distributed only while guardian powers are active. **With vaults paused, this income is effectively zero, and guardians are therefore serving unpaid.** This SIP **proposes no new compensation** and makes no claim on the treasury. It is recorded here so the DAO understands what it is asking: eight people to remain on call, retain key custody, and accept public accountability for emergency actions, with no compensation, during a wind-down. That is a reasonable ask given the stakes, but it should be an acknowledged one, not an assumed one, and it is a further reason to expect and accommodate rotation. #### 3.6 Timing | Date | Milestone | |----|----| | **\~22 Jul** | SIP published | | **\~22 Jul** | Onchain proposal submitted onchain | | **\~25 Jul** | Voting period | | **\~27 Jul** | Timelock delay (48h) | | **\~28 Jul** | Execution across all chains | | **\~9 Aug** | **Current mandate expires** | --- ### 4. Risk Assessment: #### 4.1 Risk of *not* renewing (the primary risk). The DAO loses vault pause, cap override, and proposal cancellation. A governance attack on this DAO costs roughly $30 (`22/07/2026`) to attempt; and therefore the Timelock alone is insufficient, the April attack was purpose-built to strip `CANCELLER_ROLE`. An unguarded window during treasury consolidation is the highest-risk configuration available to the DAO. #### 4.2 Centralization of emergency power. Unchanged from SIP0.2 and mitigated identically: narrowly enumerated powers, no fund movement, 75% threshold, expiry-based renewal, mandatory transparency reporting. This SIP expands nothing. #### 4.3 Guardian inactivity or capture. Mitigated by re-confirmation, and rotation to identified backups. Residual risk: signers are unpaid during a wind-down, which may degrade responsiveness over the renewal period. The liveness check is the detection mechanism. #### 4.4 Governance capture preventing renewal / conflict of interest. I am a guardian and Safe signer. The mitigation is procedural: no expansion of powers is sought, no compensation is requested, the full signer set is subject to re-confirmation and rotation, calldata is published for independent verification, and delegates are explicitly invited to contest the threshold recommendation. #### 4.5 Renewal fatigue. A fixed January 2027 expiry creates another cliff. If the DAO winds down and governance participation thins, a future renewal may struggle to reach quorum. The DAO should treat the January date as a hard calendar item and (if Option B proceeds) decide deliberately how the guardian function terminates, rather than letting it lapse by inattention. --- ### 5. Voting: > If **YES** - Renew the Guardian Module mandate: extend guardian expiration to January 2027 across Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Sonic; re-confirm the guardian set unchanged from SIP0.2. > If **NO** - Do not renew. Guardian powers lapse on \~9 August 2026, and the DAO returns to a governance-only emergency posture with no proposal-cancellation path. --- Tagging [@Recognized_Delegates](https://forum.summer.fi/groups/recognized_delegates) for review ahead of the onchain vote, and all current guardians for re-confirmation: [@blockful](https://forum.summer.fi/u/blockful), [@Raphael_Anode](https://forum.summer.fi/u/Raphael_Anode), [@halaprix](https://forum.summer.fi/u/halaprix), [@MasterMojo](https://forum.summer.fi/u/mastermojo), [@JavierD](https://forum.summer.fi/u/javierd), [@chrisb](https://forum.summer.fi/u/chrisb), [@Sixty](https://forum.summer.fi/u/sixty). Backups: [@Thomas](https://forum.summer.fi/u/thomas), [@TokenBrice](https://forum.summer.fi/u/tokenbrice), [@Meta](https://forum.summer.fi/u/meta). --jensei
`This proposal is a resubmission of the [SIP2.59.4] that did not execute the Base Network calls.` --- # Fleet cleanup — LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC Executed on the base hub by the timelock 0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796. ## Actions 1. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).unpause() — not before 2026-07-08T10:21:45.000Z 2. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(ERC4626-Fluid-usdc-8453) 3. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_Core-8453) 4. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Re7_USDC-8453) 5. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Seamless_USDC-8453) 6. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(Moonwell-usdc-8453) 7. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Steakhouse_High_Yield_USDC-8453) 8. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Extrafi_XLend_USDC-8453) 9. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Universal_USDC-8453) 10. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Clearstar_High_Yield_USDC-8453) 11. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Clearstar_Reactor_OpenEden_Boosted_USDC-8453) 12. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(MorphoVault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_Frontier-8453) 13. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(ERC4626-Euler_Base_USDC-usdc-8453) 14. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(FluidFToken-usdc-8453) 15. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(Aera-Gauntlet_Alpha-usdc-8453) 16. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).removeArk(ERC4626-Extrafi_XLend_USDC-usdc-8453) 17. FleetCommander(LazyVault_LowerRisk_USDC).setTipRate(0) — cleanup default The fleet is currently paused; unpause is only executable after 2026-07-08T10:21:45.000Z (minimum pause time).
| Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Fleet | `DAO_LazyVault_WETH_1` | | Network | Mainnet | | FleetCommander | `0x0C1FBCCC019320032D9acD193447560C8C632114` | | Arks removed | 5 | | Unpause fleet | Yes | | Set tip rate | 0 | | Risk mgmt | dao-risk-managed | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero → mainnet timelock | --- ##### Actions (in order): `unpause()` the fleet (re-enables withdrawals); `removeArk()` × 5; `setTipRate(0)`. --- ##### Arks removed: `MorphoVault-weth-Alpha_WETH_Core-1`, `MorphoVault-weth-SingularV_WETH-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-KPK_WETH_Yield_v2-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-weth-KPK_ETH_Prime_v2-1`, `FluidLite-weth-1` --- ##### Voting: > If **YES** - execute the above for DAO_LazyVault_WETH_1 on Mainnet (unpause + remove the listed zero-cap Arks + zero tip rate). > If **NO** - leave the fleet unchanged.
| Parameter | Value | |----|----| | Fleet | `DAO_LazyVault_USDC_1` | | Network | Mainnet | | FleetCommander | `0xd77F9a9F2b0C160dB3e9dC2Cce370c1a740C76fc` | | Arks removed | 10 | | Unpause fleet | Yes | | Set tip rate | 0 | | Risk mgmt | dao-risk-managed | | Execution | Base governor → LayerZero → mainnet timelock | --- ##### Actions (in order): `unpause()` the fleet (re-enables withdrawals); `removeArk()` × 10; `setTipRate(0)`. --- ##### Arks removed: `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Re_Ecosystem_Vault_USDC-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Alpha_USDC_Enhanced-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Hyperithm_USDC_Degen-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-Gauntlet_USDC_Frontier-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-KPK_USDC_Yield_V2-1`, `MorphoV2Vault-usdc-August_USDC_V2-1`, `ERC4626-Fluid-usdc-1`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Hyperithm_USDC-1`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Clearstar_High_Yield_USDC-1`, `MorphoVault-usdc-Alpha_USDC_Core-1` --- ##### Voting: > If **YES** - execute the above for DAO_LazyVault_USDC_1 on Mainnet (unpause + remove the listed zero-cap Arks + zero tip rate). > If **NO** - leave the fleet unchanged.