Wind-down SUMR lock buckets and sunset the early-unstake penalty

3. Specification:

3.1 Parameters

3.2 Calls

Function signatures, verified:

function updateLockupBucketCap(Bucket _bucket, uint256 _newCap) external onlyGovernor;
function updatePenaltyEnabled(bool _penaltyEnabled) external onlyGovernor;

Bucket enum values, verified in order:

3.3 Verified effects

• Existing stakes are untouched. Bucket caps are enforced only on the stake path (_stakeLockup → _wouldExceedBucketCap → revert). updateLockupBucketCap writes bucketData[_bucket].cap and emits LockupBucketUpdated; it does not iterate positions, alter lockupEndTime, or move tokens. Setting a cap to 0 blocks new entries and does nothing to existing ones.
• Voting power is not affected by bucket choice. stSUMR is minted 1:1 on the raw staked amount. The quadratic multiplier (WEIGHTED_STAKE_BASE + WEIGHTED_STAKE_COEFFICIENT × t²) applies to the weighted balance that drives rewards accounting only - bucket caps are applied to the unweighted amount. Since StakedSummerToken is the ERC20Votes token, a staker's governance weight is their raw stake regardless of lockup tier. Disabling lockup buckets therefore does not change anyone's voting power.
• Penalty disablement is a clean boolean. penaltyEnabled = false makes calculatePenaltyPercentage return 0. The penalty is not burned - _handleTokenTransfersOnUnstake sends the penalty to treasury(). Disabling it means early exits no longer route a fee to the treasury.
• Penalty being removed, for the record: fixed 2% if remaining lockup < FIXED_PENALTY_PERIOD (110 days), otherwise linear timeRemaining / MAX_LOCKUP_PERIOD × 20%, i.e. up to 20% at three years. After lockup ends, and for NoLockup, the penalty is already 0.
• Reversible. Both setters are governor-callable in either direction; a later SIP can restore caps or re-enable the penalty.

4. Risk Assessment:

Technical: low. Two governor-only setters on one contract, on one chain, no relay. No funds move, no roles granted, no positions closed, no user action required. Failure mode is a revert. Guardian pre-review of decoded calldata. Governance/quorum: Voting power under Governance V2 is stSUMR, so it is unaffected by bucket changes. Removing the penalty gives every locked staker an unpenalized exit at once, and with rewards ending there is little reason to stay. A large voluntary exit would reduce total stSUMR and therefore quorum. Economic. Unpenalized exits may increase circulating SUMR and create sell pressure, and the DAO treasury is heavily SUMR-weighted. The treasury also forgoes future penalty income (which, with rewards ending, is a fee charged on people leaving a program the DAO has itself discontinued). Both are foreseeable consequences of the fairness decision rather than arguments against it. Conflict of interest. Delegates voting on this are voting on terms affecting their own staked positions and voting weight. Worth stating on the record, as RFC did for delegate compensation.

5. Voting:

If YES - set the NoLockup bucket cap to type(uint256).max, set all six lockup bucket caps to 0, and call updatePenaltyEnabled(false), per the decoded calldata published in this thread. If NO - leave the staking bucket configuration and early-unstake penalty as they are.